FACE-SAVING ACTS IN FAUX PAS STORIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXTUAL CUES DURING INFERENTIAL PROCESSES OF AUTISTIC AND NON-AUTISTIC ADULTS
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Abstract
A faux pas occurs when someone unintentionally says or does something socially inappropriate. Recognition of a faux pas requires cognitive and affective theory of mind ability. The Faux Pas Recognition test consists of short stories with and without faux pas, followed by target questions assessing mental state and emotion attribution abilities.
The aim of this study was to gain deeper insight into the social cognitive abilities of autistic (N=12) and non-autistic (N=11) adults. We examined (a) whether affective and cognitive mental state attribution in autistic and non-autistic participants can be assessed more effectively through a modified version of the Faux Pas Recognition Test, and (b) whether the representation of an avoidance process as a contextual cue within the target stories of the Faux Pas Recognition Test influences the inferential and affective mental state attribution processes in autistic and non-autistic individuals. Our results indicate that the modified Faux Pas Recognition Test provides a more comprehensive assessment of participants’ social cognitive abilities, and that the presence of avoidance processes as contextual cues supports emotion attribution and consideration of the implicit meaning of an utterance.
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